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Abstract 
Targeted wage subsidies paid to employers are an important element of 
active labour market policies in Germany. This paper uses propensity 
score matching to investigate their effect on subsidised hard-to-place 
workers. In a first scenario, we estimate the average treatment effect of a 
subsidy on previously unemployed individuals. A second scenario analyses 
the effects of a subsidy on employment probabilities conditional on taking-
up employment. The third scenario investigates the additional effect of a 
subsidy on individuals, who have participated in a short-term training 
measure beforehand. Summing up and in line with the literature, the re-
sults show that subsidies have a favourable effect on the employment 
prospects of participants. 
 
Keywords: Targeted wage subsidies, evaluation of labour market pro-
grammes, propensity score matching 
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1 Introduction 
During the last decade, active labour market policies have been increas-
ingly under review. In a recent meta-study, Kluve (2006) concludes that it 
is mostly the programme type that matters for effectiveness; in particular, 
wage subsidies, services and sanctions seem to work. However, there are 
considerable differences in the design of wage subsidies. General wage 
subsidies are paid permanently for all low-wage earners in an economy, 
regardless of their employment history. Their obverse are (negative) pay-
roll taxes for employees, which has been a major vehicle used by many 
governments to stimulate employment; examples for the latter are the 
“Earned Income Tax Credit” in the US and the “Working Families Tax 
Credit” in Great Britain. Marginal wage subsidies concern only a firm’s ad-
ditional employment exceeding some reference level (Knabe et al. 2006). 
Targeted wage subsidies – or hiring subsidies as Orzag/Snower (2003) 
use the term – are tailored to particular groups of unemployed and typi-
cally granted for a limited period. Although sometimes a wider definition is 
used, we follow Fay (1996) in interpreting wage subsidies as payments to 
employers. 
This paper analyses the effectiveness of targeted wage subsidies – cover-
ing a share of labour costs and paid to employers for a fixed period of time 
– for hard-to-place workers in Germany, who took up subsidized employ-
ment during the second quarter of 2002. The programme will be described 
in detail in Section 2, which also discusses recent results from the litera-
ture. Section 3 presents the econometric approach, the evaluation strat-
egy and describes data and variables underlying the empirical analysis. 
The empirical results are depicted in Section 4. In Section 5 we draw a 
summary of the results and discuss their implications. A main feature of 
our analysis is that we extend the usual approach of estimating the effect 
of a subsidy on the treated compared to non-participation: We also esti-
mate the effect of receiving a subsidy conditional on taking up a job and 
conditional on having participated in a short-term training measure be-
forehand.  
Wage subsidies are a policy that tries to affect employment via the wage 
rate (Hamermesh 1993, Chapter 5): They obviously reduce labour costs of 
a given employee for a firm. The subsidy can compensate the firm for a 
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gap between a worker’s productivity and his minimum wage. A temporary 
subsidy might have long-run positive effects on individual labour market 
prospects if employees are able to close the gap over time by learning on-
the-job. Also, a period of subsidization might be necessary to reduce an 
employer’s uncertainty about the employability of job applicants and 
might thus serve as a screening advice.  
But wage subsidies for the unemployed are also often criticized (Layard et 
al. 1991, Chapter 10): First, several of those subsidised would have been 
recruited anyway, thus a deadweight loss occurs. The size of the effect is 
larger, when the wage elasticities of labour supply and labour demand are 
small. Second, some of those recruited will merely replace others, thus 
the subsidy does only achieve preferential treatment for some and a sub-
stitution effect occurs. Third, if subsidies produce an increase in employ-
ment in some firms, this might be at the expense of jobs in other firms, 
thus the only effect is displacement. These effects cannot be identified by 
our research approach. A fourth argument against employer-based subsi-
dies – in particular vouchers handed out to the unemployed – are poten-
tial stigma effects (Burtless 1985, Bell et al. 1999).  
However, Fay (1996) makes the point that substitution effects may not be 
considered that important from a policy perspective since the targeted 
subsidy schemes are intended to “shuffle the queue” of job-seekers. Sub-
sidies targeted at the long-term unemployed may lead employers to hire 
them instead of short-term unemployed, who would have been recruited 
in the absence of the subsidy. 
As will be discussed in detail below, wage subsidies differ from other la-
bour market instruments in the sense that participation also depends on 
the employer's hiring behaviour. For consistency, we will nevertheless use 
some expressions commonly used in the literature on the evaluation of 
social programmes. Thus, in what follows, the wage subsidy analysed will 
often be called a programme or a treatment, with the persons supported 
called participants or treated persons. 
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2 Programme features and empirical evidence 
2.1 Characteristics of the programme 
The programme we are dealing with in this paper is one of three variants 
of a wage subsidy to employers – called “Eingliederungszuschuss“ (EGZ) – 
that were in place during the period 1998 to 2003. We concentrate on the 
variant for hard-to-place workers (“EGZ bei erschwerter Vermittlung“), 
whose target group are unemployed with severe problems of reintegra-
tion, like e.g. long-term unemployed or disabled persons. Of the other two 
variants, one is characterized by a rather low level of targeting; to get the 
subsidy, the employer must give reasons for special training require-
ments. The other is targeted at workers of age 50 and older; in Germany 
unemployment rates are high and reemployment-chances are low for the 
over 50s. 
The so-called Hartz-reforms, which were initiated in 2002, caused a fun-
damental revision of active and passive labour market policies in Ger-
many. A legal reform of the EGZ was enacted in 2004, when the three 
former variants were collapsed into a single wage subsidy for hard-to-
place workers, with a looser definition of target groups and less generous 
financial support. In the past, partly also in the period under study, there 
had been very similar wage subsidy programmes also administered by the 
Federal Employment Agency (see Jaenichen 2000; ZEW et al. 2006). 
Since 2004, however, the EGZ and a weakly targeted wage subsidy for 
hires in newly founded firms are the most important wage subsidy pro-
grammes in Germany. Among smaller programmes, there is a subsidy for 
the support of severely disabled individuals and another for the promotion 
of job rotation. 
The decision to support an unemployed with an EGZ has to be reasoned in 
each individual case. Case managers in local employment agencies have 
latitude in the allowance decision as well as in the fixing of the amount 
and duration of the subsidy. The EGZ for hard-to-place persons could 
regularly account for as much as 50 percent of the monthly wage or salary 
and continue for at most 12 months. These limits could be exceeded in 
exceptional cases. As a special feature of the EGZ, a follow-up period of 
further employment is obligatory after the expiration of the subsidy. If a 
person hired with an EGZ is dismissed within this period for reasons at-
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tributable to the employer, the employer can be asked to reimburse part 
of the subsidy. 
2.2 Importance of the programme 
The EGZ and more generally targeted wage subsidies to employers repre-
sent a standard instrument in the bundle of active labour market policies 
in Germany. For a long time, training programmes and job creation in the 
public sector used to be the largest programmes in Germany; wage subsi-
dies gained importance first in East Germany during the economic restruc-
turing following the reunification and thereafter again in the late nineties. 
The EGZ is characterized by fairly high numbers of participants from 2001 
to 2003, while other wage subsidy programmes phased out in this period. 
A peak was reached in 2002 with roughly 190,000 entries into one of the 
three variants of the EGZ and 80,000 entries into the EGZ for hard-to-
place workers. As a consequence of the high stock of participants, total 
expenditure for the EGZ reached a maximum of 1.3 billion Euro in 2003. 
After 2002, the expenditures for active labour market policies decreased 
quite drastically. The budget for the most important programmes 
(“Eingliederungstitel“) dropped from 13.5 billion in 2002 to 9.1 billion in 
2004.  
Several shifts in the relative importance of different programmes accom-
panied this period: The previously most important programme for job 
creation in the public sector nearly disappeared. On the other hand, two 
programmes offering financial support for unemployed persons founding 
their own businesses grew in numbers. While the expenditure for EGZ 
dropped as well, the EGZ share of the total budget experienced a slight 
increase from 9.1 percent in 2002 to 10.0 percent in 2004 (Bernhard et al. 
2006). There was a further structural break in German labour market poli-
cies in early 2005, when the former unemployment assistance for long-
term unemployed persons was integrated with the former social assis-
tance. 
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Table 1: Transitions from unemployment during the year 2004:  
Employment states following unemployment exits in 2004 
    Germany West East 
  Transition to ... in 1000
in 
%
in 
1000 
in  
% 
in 
1000
in 
%
I. Labour Market Programmes 1678 29 1000 25 678 39
  • Wage Subsidy 151 3 78 2 73 4
  • Self-Employment (with assistance) 272 5 186 5 87 5
  • Training Programme (short- and long-term measures) 987 17 650 16 337 19
  • Public Job Creation 267 5 86 2 181 10
II. Employment 2105 37 1517 38 588 34
  • Regular Employment 1830 32 1305 32 525 30
  • Mini-Jobs (max. 360 €/month) 252 4 192 5 60 3
  • Self-Employment (without assistance) 23 0 20 0 4 0
III. Other (educational system, non-participation) 1972 34 1510 37 462 27
IV. Number of Spells 5754 100 4026 100 1728 100
Source:  Own calculations based on Rothe (2007). 
 
How important are active labour market programmes and especially wage 
subsidies for transitions out of unemployment? First, long-term unem-
ployment is still a huge problem in Germany. According to OECD Data, 
long-term unemployment was equal to or above 50 percent of total un-
employment in every year from 2003 to 2005 (OECD 2006). Second, the 
most frequent transition out of unemployment is still into regular em-
ployment. However, as Table 1 shows, transitions from unemployment 
into various labour market programmes accounted for nearly 30 percent 
of all unemployment exits and thus came close to exits into regular em-
ployment, which accounted for 32 percent of all unemployment exits in 
2004 (Rothe 2007). The large share of exits into programmes is mostly 
due to the short-term training measures and to start-up programmes that 
promote self-employment of formerly unemployed. In contrast, transitions 
into (temporarily) subsidised employment like the EGZ accounted for only 
2.6 percent of all unemployment exits in 2004. Thus, looking at aggregate 
figures, exits into a wage subsidy programme are of limited importance 
for leaving unemployment in Germany. Furthermore, compared to non-
subsidised jobs, subsidised jobs only account for a small fraction of transi-
tions to employment. 
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2.3 Selected review of the literature 
A number of studies have estimated the impact of targeted wage subsi-
dies on participants. This requires knowledge of the potential that labour 
market prospects participants would have had without the help of a sub-
sidy. Several authors constructed comparison groups of similar, but non-
treated individuals using statistical matching techniques and non-experi-
mental data (see Section 3.1). For Germany, Jaenichen (2002, 2005) and 
Bernhard et al. (2006) used this approach and showed that different kinds 
of targeted wage subsidies had a positive effect on the employment pros-
pects of previously unemployed persons and helped to avoid further un-
employment.  
Dorsett (2006) evaluated the British “New Deal” reform for young work-
ers. A key option available to young workers of age 18 to 24, who had 
been claiming job seeker's allowance for six months or more, was a 
voucher for a subsidy to prospective employers. The voucher covered 60 
pounds per week; this amount was paid for six months. Other options 
were full-time education, placement in a voluntary sector organization or 
environmental task force or staying in an “extended gateway”. His result 
was that in the long run – after an initial lock-in effect – the subsidy 
dominated all other options in preventing unemployment.  
Positive results on the effectiveness of targeted wage subsidies have also 
been obtained in a number of studies for Sweden. Sianesi (2002) used 
matching techniques to compare the effects of participation in different 
labour market programmes in Sweden. She looked at individuals who be-
came unemployed during 1994. Employers could claim subsidies for adults 
with unemployment duration of at least 6 months; the grant covered 50 
percent of labour costs up to a fixed amount. According to her results, re-
cruitment subsidies were the only scheme that improved the individual 
probability to get and keep a job. Carling/Richardson (2004) similarly 
compared the effectiveness of different programmes in reducing the un-
employment duration of participants in Sweden, but estimated a hazard 
rate model instead. Their results were again in favour of subsidised work 
and training provided by firms, compared to classroom vocational training.  
Furthermore, Fredriksson/Johansson (2004) and Forslund et al. (2004) 
analysed the effectiveness of a targeted, time-limited wage subsidy 
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scheme in Sweden. The scheme under consideration was implemented in 
1998 and granted up to 50 percent of wages for a maximum of six months 
to firms who recruited long-term unemployed. Fredriksson/Johansson 
(2004) applied nonparametric survival function matching estimators to 
demonstrate the importance of the timing of programme entry. Their re-
sult was again that longer run effects are positive. While the studies cited 
so far rely on the large number of observable characteristics available in 
their data sets to estimate treatment effects, Forslund et al. (2004) addi-
tionally used instrumental variable difference-in-difference techniques. 
However, independently of the method used, the results suggested that 
wage subsidies had a positive effect on employment probabilities of the 
participants.  
For the State of Wisconsin, Hamersma (2005) estimated the effects of eli-
gibility to two wage subsidy programmes on employment, comparing 
those who are eligible with those who are nearly eligible. The programmes 
analysed are the “Work Opportunity Tax Credit” and the “Welfare-to-Work 
Tax Credit”. For both programmes employers have to apply and – if 
granted – claim the subsidy on their federal tax return. The former pro-
gramme is targeted at new hires from certain disadvantaged groups and 
covers up to 40 percent of the wage rate for the first year of employment. 
The latter programme aims at long-term welfare recipients and reim-
burses 35 percent of wages in the first year and 50 percent in the second 
year. Both programmes were subject to an upper bound of earnings sub-
sidised. Hamersma used a difference-in-differences matching estimator. 
She found limited effects on the labour market results of the eligible popu-
lation. However, her information was restricted to a period of 18 months 
after the subsidy had started and the numbers of individuals participating 
in the programme were rather small.  
Few studies are based on social experiments, where treatment is allocated 
randomly among the unemployed (Burtless 1985), or on natural experi-
ments, which utilize changes in legislation and apply difference-in-
differences estimators to the treated group and a similar group that is un-
affected by the changes (Boockmann et al. 2007). An early social experi-
ment of the effectiveness of targeted wage subsidies dates back to Bur-
tless (1985), who investigated a programme that was conducted in Ohio 
during the years 1980 to 1981. Some of the job seekers were given 
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vouchers identifying them to employers as eligible for a tax credit or for a 
direct cash rebate. The subsidy amounted to 50 percent of wages during 
the first year and 25 percent of wages during the second year of employ-
ment, up to a threshold. Burtless showed that unemployed persons with a 
voucher were less likely to find employment than job-seekers without 
vouchers. He speculated that vouchers had a stigmatizing effect and were 
used by employers as a screening device.  
For Germany, Boockmann et al. (2007) investigated changes in the legis-
lation regarding the EGZ for workers of 50 or older. The regular subsidy 
used to amount to 50 percent of the wage rate, paid in monthly rates for 
up to two years. In exceptional cases, the subsidy could be granted at up 
to 70 percent for up to five years. Two changes took place in 2002 and 
2004: In 2002, eligibility for the programme – which earlier had covered 
only the long-term unemployed – was extended to all workers of 50 or 
older. In 2004, under the new EGZ, eligibility was again confined to hard-
to-place persons, which implies a stricter definition of the target group 
than the age restriction alone. The special conditions for older workers 
with respect to the duration of the subsidy were cut down to a new maxi-
mum duration of three years. The authors used a difference-in-differences 
estimator to compare changes in transition probabilities between the 
treatment group (defined as all workers of 50) and the control group 
(comprised of slightly younger workers). Significant effects of the changes 
in conditions were found only for the subgroup of female workers in East 
Germany. The authors concluded that increases in subsidised employment 
for all other groups investigated are absorbed by deadweight losses. How-
ever, in interpreting the results, one has to take into account that only a 
comparatively small percentage of individuals in the age groups investi-
gated actually received the subsidy and that changes in legislation af-
fected mainly the duration of the subsidy. 
Finally, a comparison of subsidised and non-subsidised individuals taking-
up a job has been conducted by Cockx et al. (1998). They analysed tem-
porary wage subsidies that have been paid to employers in Belgium during 
1991 and 1992. The subsidy was granted for 12 to 24 months and cov-
ered 10 to 50 percent of the wage rate; it was often targeted at particular 
groups. The authors utilized data from firms on their last five recruitments 
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and estimate a duration model. They found positive, but insignificant ef-
fects of the subsidy on job tenure.  
Summing up, a number of studies based on non-experimental data obtain 
the result that targeted wage subsidies improve the labour market 
chances of the unemployed. The few findings from social and natural ex-
periments are more ambiguous. However, one has to be careful in com-
paring results from different countries: There are large differences in pro-
gramme sizes as well as in the amount and duration of wage subsidies. 
The implementation of such measures differs across countries. Finally, the 
institutional framework – for instance replacement rates and the impor-
tance of activation strategies – will also have an impact on the success of 
a labour market programme.  
3 Evaluation approach, data and variables 
3.1 Econometric strategy 
We are interested in the impact of the subsidy on the labour market out-
comes of participants, in particular on their chances to remain employed 
or to become unemployed again. The fundamental evaluation problem is 
caused by the fact that participants in labour market programmes will sort 
themselves (or will be sorted) into programmes on the basis of their cur-
rent as well as of their expected labour market prospects.  
In the absence of an experimental design, a simple comparison of the out-
comes of participants with the outcomes of a sample of persons, who did 
not participate, will usually lead to biased evaluation results: The selection 
of participants into the programme on the basis of individual characteris-
tics induces a correlation of these characteristics and the observed post-
programme outcomes. The idea of constructing control groups is to find a 
very similar group of individuals, who have not participated (or partici-
pated only later), such that the outcomes of this group can be interpreted 
as counterfactual outcomes of the group of participants.  
The formal notation follows the potential outcome approach (Rubin 1974, 
Lechner 1999, see also Heckman et al. 1999). We think of every person 
having two potential (post-programme) outcomes, so let 1Y  be the poten-
tial outcome for the case that a person participates in a programme and 
0Y  the potential outcome in the case of non-participation. In our evalua-
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tion, participation stands for an entry into the EGZ programme during the 
second quarter (q2) of 2002. We utilize a binary variable 2qD  to distin-
guish between participants )1( 2 =qD  und non-participants )0( 2 =qD . Let us 
furthermore assume that the programme does not have effects on the la-
bour market outcomes of non-participants; this is the stable unit treat-
ment value assumption.  
The parameter we want to estimate, the mean effect of treatment on the 
treated, is given by the expected difference in an individual’s two potential 
outcomes: 
(1) [ ] [ ] [ ])1(|)1(|)1(| 2021201 =−===− qqq DYEDYEDYYE . 
The first term on the right-hand side can easily be estimated by the mean 
of the observed outcomes of participants. However, there is no such sim-
ple empirical equivalent for the second term on the right-hand side, repre-
senting the potential outcomes of participants in the case of non-
participation. The outcomes of an arbitrary group of non-participants do 
not provide a good estimate of the participants’ counterfactuals, if access 
to the programme is correlated with individual characteristics. In our wage 
subsidy problem, the participants will have better labour market prospects 
than the typical long-term unemployed, because at least they managed to 
get a subsidised job. At the same time, they will have worse labour mar-
ket prospects than the average unemployed moving to a regular job with-
out the support of a subsidy. Thus [ ])(| 0DYE q =20  does not provide an es-
timator of [ ])(| 1DYE q =20 . 
Matching methods solve this problem by choosing a control group with a 
distribution of characteristics similar to the distribution observed for the 
group of participants. They rely on the conditional independence assump-
tion (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983, Lechner 1999), which requires 0Y   ⊥ 
XDq |2 , where ⊥ denotes statistical independence. The vector X  contains 
all variables that jointly influence selection into the programme as well as 
post-programme outcomes. The interpretation is that – conditional on X  
– the outcome when non-participating does not differ between participants 
and non-participants. Hence it is legitimate to simulate the non-
participation outcomes of participants using the outcomes of non-
participants.  
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The estimator for the mean effect of treatment is then given by 
(2) [ ] [ ])0,(|)1,(|)1(| 2021201 =−===− qqq DXYDXYEDYYE . 
The estimation of (2) using the outcomes of a control group is valid only if 
there are non-participants with characteristics similar to those of partici-
pants over the whole X -space. This is the condition of common support 
and implies that the distributions of the X -variables must be overlapping 
for all values of X  (Heckman et al. 1999). With targeted programmes, 
the fulfilment of this condition cannot be assumed a priori.  
Propensity score matching is a two-stage method suggested by Rosen-
baum/Rubin (1983): Instead of conditioning on every single element of X  
in estimating the treatment effect, it suffices to condition on the participa-
tion probability, respectively the propensity score )|1()( 2 XDPXP q == . In 
a first step, the propensity score for participants and non-participants is 
estimated – for instance by a probit model – using the vector X  as ex-
ogenous variables. Common support here implies that the evaluation is 
confined to the interval in which there are values of the propensity score 
for both groups. The second step consists of a selection of a control group 
such that the distributions of the propensity scores are similar (balanced) 
for participants and controls. 
In this paper, we use nearest-neighbour matching with replacement and 
apply the STATA-module psmatch2 (Sianesi/Leuven 2003). Matching is 
performed by choosing a non-participant for every participant, such that 
the distance between their propensity scores is minimized. Replacement 
implies that a non-participant can be used more than once in the match-
ing procedure. The programme impact is estimated as the mean differ-
ence in the outcomes of both groups. To compute the variance of the es-
timator, we use a simple variance formula (Lechner 2001), which accounts 
for the possible variance-inflating effect of the multiple uses of non-
participants. However, the formula neglects the uncertainty involved in 
the estimation of the propensity score. 
To assess the quality of the matching we compute – before and after the 
matching took place – the mean standardized bias (MSB, Rosenbaum/ 
Rubin 1983) of the explaining variables between each treated group and 
its matched control group. The standardized bias of a covariate is defined 
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as the difference of means in the treated and matched control sample, di-
vided by the square root of the average sample variance. A lower value of 
the MSB indicates more similarity between both groups. 
3.2 Evaluation strategy 
The aim of constructing control groups is to impute the counterfactual 
outcomes for participants, if the latter had not taken up the subsidised job 
at the time they actually did. While matching methods help to balance the 
distribution of individual characteristics between the groups of participants 
and non-participants, it is nevertheless important to be precise about 
what is the counterfactual situation of interest. 
The evaluation period usually starts with the entry into the programme 
and covers the time interval for which the outcomes of participants and 
control group are evaluated. Prevailing examples of control group defini-
tions are: 
a) Persons, who do not participate in any labour market programme during 
the whole evaluation period (e.g. Gerfin/Lechner 2002). 
b) Persons, who did not participate in a labour market programme until 
the beginning of the evaluation period, but may participate later on 
(e.g. Sianesi 2002, 2004). 
c) Persons, who entered a different labour market programme at the be-
ginning of the evaluation period (e.g. Gerfin/Lechner 2002, Sianesi 
2002). 
The idea underlying the first approach is to imitate a social experiment, in 
which a randomly chosen group of the population is assigned to treat-
ment, while another random group, whose members will not receive 
treatment, acts as a control group. In such an experimental design and 
under certain ideal conditions – everybody in the treatment group receives 
treatment and members of the control group will not get another kind of 
treatment – a simple comparison of the outcomes of the treated group 
and the control group can give a consistent estimate of the programme 
impact (see Heckman et al. 1999 for a discussion of problems with ex-
perimental evaluation). With non-experimental data, however, one prob-
lem consists in the non-randomness of the timing of programme participa-
tion in an unemployment spell. If people enter a programme because they 
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did not find a job before, or they do not enter a programme because they 
expect to find a job quickly, this creates a relationship between the prob-
ability of programme participation and the probability of finding a job. 
Therefore, if the timing of programme entry is not taken into account, 
matching conditional on individual characteristics might not remove selec-
tivity (Sianesi 2001, Fredriksson/Johansson 2004). This is an argument for 
using the second definition – applied as well in our empirical strategy – for 
comparisons with non-participants. 
The third definition of the control group permits a comparison of the im-
pact of one programme with that of another programme, given that there 
is sufficient overlap in the distributions of the characteristics of the two 
groups of participants. Larsson (2003) and Sianesi (2001) make the point 
in their evaluations of Swedish active labour market policies that there is 
no no-treatment group among the unemployed in Sweden: Every unem-
ployed person will either leave unemployment without assistance or 
he/she will sooner or later participate in some kind of labour market pro-
gramme. In such an institutional setting, it makes more sense to compare 
participants in different programmes. 
In our analysis, we will look at three different counterfactuals for persons 
entering wage subsidy programmes: 
1) The effect of taking up a subsidised job versus remaining unemployed. 
2) The effect of taking up a subsidised job versus taking up non-subsi-
dised employment. 
3) The effect of taking up a subsidised job after a short period of on-the-
job training versus participation in on-the-job training only, where the 
subsidised job may or may not be in the same firm. 
The first scenario is adequate, if the job and programme allocation proc-
ess is such that – for any group of unemployed persons with identical 
characteristics – the selection into subsidised jobs is random and not 
driven by systematic factors. A strong argument against this is that the 
treatment in the case of the EGZ is not solely the subsidy, but the subsidy 
in combination with a new job. In other words, wage subsidies like the 
EGZ cannot be ”prescribed“ and there must be an employer willing to offer 
a job to the person in question. Thus, the access to EGZ might be driven 
by factors observable to employers, but not identified in the data, as for 
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instance the motivation of unemployed individuals and the assessment of 
these skills through caseworkers and firms.  
Accordingly, an argument against the matching approach in the context of 
wage subsidies is that the fact that someone has been able to find at least 
a subsidised job is as such a hint on unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
However, unobserved heterogeneity will be strongly correlated with the 
observed explaining variables; this should hold particularly for information 
on an individual’s labour market history (Heckman et al. 1999). Thus, we 
are rather confident that this problem will not be a major one for the data 
at hand, as we have information on previous employment history, which 
should capture most of the effects of unobserved individual factors.  
What we do not observe, however, are employer characteristics. It is very 
plausible that labour demand side factors will influence access to subsi-
dised jobs as well as the probability of further employment. A worker with 
given characteristics might be able to get and keep an unsubsidised job at 
some employers, “only” a subsidised job at others and no job at all in the 
remaining firms. The matching of workers to heterogeneous firms, to-
gether with the lack of information on employer characteristics (at least in 
our data), may therefore produce a bias in our impact estimates which is 
similar to selection bias resulting from individual heterogeneity.  
Another problem inherent in the data construction for this first scenario is 
an initial advantage of participants over non-participants. This initial ad-
vantage results because the participants are sampled conditional on their 
unemployment exit, while the non-participants, by definition, are unem-
ployed at the beginning of the evaluation period (Jaenichen 2002). This 
last problem should however vanish over time, as more and more non-
participants leave unemployment. Furthermore, in our outcome variables 
for evaluation, we will include subsidised employment as well as the fol-
low-up period of compulsory employment in the category ”not employed“. 
This also should lead to a more conservative valuation of the participant’s 
outcomes. 
The second scenario tries to avoid some of the problems of the first sce-
nario. Here, we compare participants supported with EGZ to persons who 
have left unemployment for regular employment at the same time. Within 
this scenario, there might again be problems of unobserved individual het-
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erogeneity or unobserved employer-side influences. Individual heteroge-
neity could exist, since treated individuals have been able to find only a 
subsidised job. One could think of the local placement officers as having 
more knowledge about an individual’s reemployment chances than we 
have on the basis of the variables in our data. However, the argument 
given above applies again: Information on the previous employment his-
tory should absorb most of individual heterogeneity. With respect to em-
ployer-side influences, we can argue with some plausibility that both par-
ticipants and controls in this scenario are subject to such factors. So, if 
there is no systematic heterogeneity between firms utilizing subsidies and 
firms who do not, there is no reason to assume a bias provoked by the 
lack of information on firms. Existing studies for German firms do indeed 
identify variables influencing the probability that firms make use of wage 
subsidies. However, the results are not unambiguous (Hartmann 2004, 
Jaenichen 1999). 
The third scenario is suggested by the observation that there has been 
combined use of the EGZ with other labour market programmes and espe-
cially with short-term training measures in firms (“betriebliche Trai-
ningsmaßnahmen”). The question we ask is, whether there is an addi-
tional advantage of an EGZ after such a short-term training measure in 
comparison to short-term training only. To the degree that short-term 
training serves as a filter for employment, there might be a selection 
problem, if those workers later participating in the EGZ programme had 
performed better during their training period and thus were employable. 
However, it may also be the case that employers, knowing about the 
”true“ productivity after the end of the training period, have better argu-
ments to bargain for a further period of subsidised employment. In this 
case, the workers with combined participation of training and EGZ would 
be those who really need a subsidy for integration. Summarizing, in this 
third scenario, the possibility to screen the worker during the training pe-
riod might give rise to selectivity and this should be kept in mind for the 
interpretation of the results. 
3.3 Data and variables 
We utilize administrative data collected and provided by the German Fed-
eral Employment Agency. The newly constructed research data set Inte-
grated Employment Biographies (IEB) contains detailed information on 
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socio-demographic characteristics, programme participation, employment 
and unemployment histories. Hummel et al. (2005) describe a sample of 
the database that is open for public use through the Research Data Center 
of the Federal Employment Agency. The IEB is composed of four data-
bases, which are all organised in the form of episodes: 
a) The IAB employment history (BeH) includes compulsory reports of 
companies on dependent employment relationships, for which social 
security contributions have been paid. 
b) Data on job search originating from the applicants pool database 
(BewA) encloses detailed information on jobseekers’ characteristics. 
c) The participants-in-measures data (MTG) merges information on par-
ticipation an active labour market programmes. 
d) The IAB benefit recipient history (LeH) covers information on times 
during which unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance has 
been paid. 
These data were supplemented by the most current information on labour 
market status available from the data warehouse of the Federal Employ-
ment Agency. The combination of information on programme episodes 
and on employment episodes allows us to distinguish between times in 
subsidised employment (through a wage subsidy or in a public job crea-
tion measure) and regular employment. Since the data stem from differ-
ent sources, we had to correct several inconsistencies.  
For our first and second scenario, the treatment sample consists of all in-
dividuals taking up subsidised employment during the second quarter of 
2002, who have been unemployed beforehand (these were about 85 per-
cent of all individuals receiving an EGZ during this period). Thus, our 
analysis avoids the problem of dynamic programme entry (Sianesi 2004, 
Frederiksson/Johansson 2004) by sampling only persons, who started 
their subsidised employment during a short interval of time. The analysis 
of the third scenario is based on a sample of all individuals that have par-
ticipated in a firm-related short-term training measure (with a maximum 
duration of three months) during the first half-year of 2002 and have 
taken up a subsidised job within three months after the training measure 
has ended. From those receiving an EGZ in the second quarter of 2002, 
about 20 percent had previously participated in a short-term training 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 16/2007   
 
 
21
measure; 64 percent of these measures had taken place within establish-
ments.  
Special data sets were built up to get a pool of potential control persons 
for each scenario. For the first scenario, control groups were taken from 
monthly 2.5-percent-samples of entries into unemployment since 2000. 
For the second scenario, we utilize a 75-percent-sample of entries into 
employment from the first half-year of 2002. Finally, a sample of 310,000 
exits from short-term training measures between October 2001 and June 
2002 forms the basis for the construction of control groups for the third 
scenario. 
Our analysis distinguishes between several subgroups of participants. 
First, all analyses were conducted separately by gender and region (West 
vs. East Germany). Furthermore, we distinguish short-term subsidies with 
a duration of four to six months from long-term subsidies lasting from 
seven to twelve months. Because of small case-loads for short-term sub-
sidies, the impact of the EGZ in the third scenario is only estimated for 
long-term subsidies. The actual durations are clustered at the upper 
bounds of the chosen intervals: Among all EGZ for hard-to-place workers 
that were granted for no longer than a year, 68 percent had a length of 
one year and 17 percent a length of half a year.  
We consider two binary outcome variables to describe the labour market 
status. Our first outcome variable indicates whether an individual is in un-
subsidised employment at the beginning of a month. The second outcome 
variable shows whether a person has successfully avoided unemployment 
at the beginning of a month (he/she is not registered as unemployed or as 
participating in a labour market measure). Beyond the period of subsidiza-
tion itself, we interpret the follow-up period, during which the employer is 
obliged to sustain the employment relationship, as a further period of pro-
gramme participation.  
If we observe differences in estimated treatment effects between the two 
outcome variables, than the share of individuals in the treated group and 
in the control group switching to an “unobserved” state differs. In fact, 
there are many gaps between intervals of employment, unemployment 
and participation in measures, without any information on the labour mar-
ket state during these periods. In most cases, these gaps probably result 
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from the fact that individuals have withdrawn from the labour market for a 
shorter or longer period of time (examples are home-time or early retire-
ment). However, self-employed individuals also do not appear in the reg-
ister.  
To measure the outcomes of control group members, hypothetical starting 
dates are required. The problem is solved differently for each evaluation 
scenario. In the first scenario, each matched control person is assigned 
the starting date of his/her treated counterpart. If a matched control per-
son is no longer unemployed at this hypothetical starting date (which is 
the case for relatively few observations), the matched pair is deleted from 
the sample. In the second scenario, outcomes of control persons are 
measured beginning with the month of entry into employment. In the 
third scenario, a hypothetical starting date for matched controls is ob-
tained by adding the time span between the participant's training pro-
gramme exit and his/her entry into the EGZ to the control's end date of 
the training pro-gramme.  
The non-testable conditional independence assumption requires the ob-
servation of all explaining variables that determine selection into the 
programme as well as the outcome in the case of non-participation. The 
selection into the programme is the result of individual choice, of case-
workers’ assessments and negotiation strategies as well as of firms’ 
choices and behaviour. We model selection using the following observable 
information on individuals: 
a) socio-demographic characteristics (nationality, age, education, health 
and – for female workers – information on the family status), 
b) variables on the five-year-history prior to the respective unemployment 
spell (participation in measures and years in unsubsidised regular em-
ployment), 
c) the timing of entry into unemployment, 
d) information on the regional labour market situation (performance clus-
ter suggested by Blien et al. 2004).  
All variables are categorized as dummy variables and measured at the be-
ginning of the subsidised employment spell. For members of the control 
groups, time-varying variables are measured in the midth of the first 
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quarter 2002. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows variable means of selected 
explanatory variables for subsidised workers as well as for our samples of 
potential control persons. Subsidised persons might be regarded to be a 
positive selection compared to all unemployed, but as a negative selection 
compared to those who have been hired into a regular unsubsidised job. 
The sample of individuals, who do not take up a subsidised job after hav-
ing completed a training measure, might have some labour market advan-
tages compared to those who receive a subsidy later. Comparing both re-
gions of Germany, participants in East Germany have on average a better 
qualification, less health problems and more often experience in previous 
programme participation 
As we have already discussed in detail in Section 3.2, we are confident 
that unobserved individual heterogeneity should not be a major problem 
for our analysis. Note furthermore, that – due to the large size of the 
samples of potential controls – common support is achieved for all treated 
individuals in our sample. The stable unit treatment value assumption can 
be supposed to hold due to the rather low importance of inflows into sub-
sidised jobs (Section 2.2). 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Effect of a subsidy on the treated 
In the first scenario, we estimate the average effect of the EGZ on the 
employment prospects of previously unemployed persons. As a counter-
factual, we have the option to participate never or only later in a labour 
market programme. Table 2 displays in Panel IV mean standardized biases 
before and after matching. The bias reduction obtained through the 
matching procedure is on average slightly less than 80 percent, the abso-
lute value of the mean standardized bias after matching never exceeds 
the value of 5. Thus the quality of the matching seems quite satisfactory. 
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Table 2: Individuals taking up a subsidised job (Treated) and matched unem-
ployed persons (Controls): 
Labour market status, estimated average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT), mean standardized bias before and after matching  
and bias reduction three years after programme start during the 2nd 
quarter of 2002 
      Short-term subsidy Long-term subsidy 
  
    
Male 
West 
Fe-
male 
West
Male 
East 
Fe-
male 
East 
Male 
West
Fe-
male 
West 
Male 
East 
Fe-
male 
East 
Treated 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.65 0.44 0.55 0.48 0.60
Controls 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.22I. Share in regular un-subsidised employment 
ATT 0.27 0.34 0.26 0.42 0.25 0.35 0.26 0.38
Treated 0.62 0.73 0.60 0.72 0.57 0.70 0.58 0.68
Controls 0.47 0.58 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.40 0.43II. 
Share not unemployed 
and not in labour mar-
ket measure ATT 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.25
Treated 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.09
III. Share with unknown destination (Diff. II-I) Controls 0.24 0.35 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.33 0.18 0.22
Before 10.42 12.13 12.32 11.93 13.16 13.92 13.37 12.62
After 2.03 4.10 3.12 4.90 2.49 3.09 1.78 2.44IV. Mean standardized bias 
Reduction 0.80 0.66 0.75 0.59 0.81 0.78 0.87 0.81
V. Observations   1269 597 339 242 1880 983 3293 3045
Note: All estimated treatment effects are significant at α = 0.05. Short-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 
6 months, while long-term subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months. Small differences in the number of 
observations compared to Table A.1 result from the fact that each matched control person was as-
signed the date of the treatment start of his/her treated counterpart. If the matched control person was 
no longer unemployed on this “hypothetical” starting date, the matched pair was dropped from further 
analysis. 
 
Panel I and II of Table 2 summarize the results three years after pro-
gramme start, documenting the share of treated and of matched control 
persons in regular unsubsidised employment, the share that is not unem-
ployed (or in a labour market measure) as well as average treatment ef-
fects on the treated. The evolution of the estimated average treatment 
effects over time is displayed in Figure 1. Plots above the abscissa have to 
been interpreted as a “success” of the particular programme. Remember 
that the period of subsidization as well as the following period, during 
which the employer is obliged to sustain the employment relationship, is 
not interpreted as a “labour market success” in the sense of both outcome 
variables. 
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Figure 1: Estimated average treatment effects on individuals taking up  
a subsidised job (ATT) during the 2nd quarter of 2002 
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Note: Displayed effects are significant at α = 0.05. Short-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months, 
while long-term subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months. 
 
Figure 1 shows for the period of subsidization and for the compulsory pe-
riod of further employment that treated individuals were less often in un-
subsidised employment and have less often avoided unemployment. 
These locking-in effects are a necessary side-effect of the construction of 
the outcome variables. We find large and significant positive effects of the 
treatment on the treated immediately after the end of the support by the 
programme, which, however, decline slightly over time.  
Three years after the start of subsidization, the share in “regular unsubsi-
dised employment” is still 0.25 to 0.42 higher in the treated group than in 
the matched control group. In other words, we estimate that without 
treatment 25 to 42 percentage points of the treated would not have been 
regular employed. Turning to our second outcome variable, the difference 
in the shares “not unemployed and not in measure” varies between 0.14 
and 0.28; thus 14 to 28 additional percentage points of the treated would 
have been unemployed without treatment.  
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The striking difference between both outcome variables results from a dif-
ferent share of individuals with an unknown state in the treated and the 
matched control group (Panel III of Table 2); the share is on average half 
as high in the treated group. This implies that a higher percentage of un-
treated individuals withdraw from the labour market as discouraged work-
ers. Thus the subsidies help to activate hard-to-place individuals, who 
might otherwise have withdrawn from the labour market. 
Comparisons of estimates of the treatment effect between the different 
groups investigated must be interpreted with caution, since characteristics 
of group members differ for each group (see Table 2). Nonetheless, some 
results should be mentioned: 
• Across control groups, the average outcome “unsubsidised employ-
ment” (Panel I of Table 2) does not differ remarkably by gender or re-
gion, but is slightly smaller for the long-term subsidy. However, across 
treated groups the grant of an EGZ seems to have had a particularly 
large effect on employment opportunities of female workers, which was 
even stronger in East Germany. Accordingly, estimated treatment ef-
fects are much higher for female than for male workers.  
• For the outcome “not unemployed and not in measure” (Panel II of Ta-
ble 2), we observe a striking result for the matched control sample of 
females from West Germany – they are less often unemployed than fe-
males from East Germany or males. An obvious explanation is that 
housework has always been a rather accepted alternative for women in 
West Germany, which facilitates withdrawing from the labour market. 
Looking at the treatment groups, the outcome is again more advanta-
geous for female workers. The net result is that the estimated treat-
ment effect is highest for the group of females in East Germany and 
does not differ much among the other groups. 
• Comparing the recipients of short-term and long-term EGZ, labour mar-
ket outcomes are always more favourable for treated individuals who 
received a short EGZ as well as for their matched control persons. This 
is not surprising, since the duration of the subsidy should be a function 
of placement difficulties. However, estimated average treatment effects 
are rather similar for short- and long-term subsidies at each point of 
time after the employment promotion had expired (Figure 1).  
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A deadweight loss in a narrower sense only occurs when the same individ-
ual would have got the same job without the help of the EGZ. Data and 
technique applied do not provide a measure for this effect. Some studies 
for other labour market measures interpret the share of the matched con-
trol group that has successfully found an unsubsidised job as a measure of 
the deadweight loss in a wider sense (Winterhager et al. 2006, 513). In 
this sense, the deadweight accompanying EGZ would be around 20 per-
centage points (Panel I of Table 2). 
4.2 Effect of a subsidy conditional on taking up a job 
The second scenario analyses the average effect of the EGZ on the 
treated, conditional on having taken a job. Thus the questions analysed 
here and in the former section are fundamentally different: The previous 
estimates referred to the combined effect of receiving a subsidy and tak-
ing a job. This section investigates solely the effect of the subsidy, condi-
tional on having found a (subsidised or unsubsidised) job. The results of 
the estimates can be found in Table 3 and Figure 2. The information on 
the mean standardized bias in Panel IV of Table 3 indicates again a satis-
factory matching quality, with a mean bias reduction of more than 80 per-
cent through the matching procedure. 
Figure 2 shows clearly the initial lock-in effect of subsidization. However, 
after the subsidy and the obligation period have expired, the average 
treatment effect is rather small, follows no obvious trend and is very simi-
lar for short-term and long-term subsidies: Three years after the subsidy 
started, the effect is insignificant for all groups except for female workers 
in East Germany, which fare slightly better, if they have started in a sub-
sidised employment relationship (Panel I and II of Table 3). Estimated 
treatment effects do not differ remarkably between both outcome vari-
ables; around 10 percentage points of the treatment group as well as of 
the matched control sample “vanish” into an unobserved labour market 
state.  
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Table 3: Individuals taking up a subsidised job (Treated) and matched persons 
taking up an unsubsidised job (Controls): 
Labour market status, estimated average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT), mean standardized bias before and after matching  
and bias reduction three years after programme start during the 2nd 
quarter of 2002 
      Short-term subsidy Long-term subsidy 
  
    
Male 
West 
Fe-
male 
West
Male 
East 
Fe-
male 
East 
Male 
West 
Fe-
male 
West 
Male 
East 
Fe-
male 
East 
Treated 0.50 0.57 0.48 0.64 0.44 0.56 0.49 0.60
Controls 0.49 0.60 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.56 0.45 0.52I. Share in regular un-subsidised employment 
ATT n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.14 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.08
Treated 0.62 0.72 0.60 0.70 0.57 0.70 0.58 0.68
Controls 0.61 0.74 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.71 0.55 0.64II. 
Share not unemployed 
and not in labour mar-
ket measure ATT n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.04
Treated 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.09
III. Share with unknown  destination (Diff. II-I) Controls 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.12
Before 15.85 13.00 16.45 14.66 20.75 15.41 19.94 14.38
After 1.77 3.10 2.53 4.29 1.91 2.53 1.45 2.06IV. Mean standardized bias 
Reduction 0.89 0.76 0.85 0.71 0.91 0.84 0.93 0.86
V. Observations   1398 657 372 253 2044 1064 3580 3379
Note: n.s. = not significant at α = 0.05. Short-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months, while long-
term subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months. 
 
In choosing the members of the matched control group, we focus on their 
labour market success – finding an unsubsidised job. We control for a 
number of observable characteristics of workers, which should also ac-
count at least partly for unobserved characteristics (see the discussion of 
the conditional independence assumption in Section 3.3). However, the 
matched control group will differ from the treated group at least regarding 
some characteristics of the job. Jobs taken up by unsubsidised workers 
are probably – in terms of realised or perceived productivity – a positive 
selection compared to jobs taken up by subsidised workers. The results 
show, however, that employment prospects of individuals taking-up sub-
sidised employment are – in the longer run – not worse than those of in-
dividuals, who entered an unsubsidised employment relationship.  
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Figure 2: Estimated average treatment effects on individuals receiving  
a subsidy conditional on taking up a job (ATT) during the 2nd  
quarter of 2002 
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Note: Displayed effects are significant at α = 0.05. Short subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months, while 
long subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months.  
 
4.3 Effect of a subsidy conditional on participation in a 
short training measure 
In the last scenario, we estimate the average effect of the EGZ on sup-
ported individuals conditional on having participated in a firm-related 
short-term training measure beforehand. The analysis thus hinges on hav-
ing gained at least some work experience within a firm during the last 
quarter. However, we cannot distinguish between situations, where em-
ployers have already filtered the more suited candidates for a subsidised 
job from training participants, and situations, where employers claim the 
subsidy because a worker's lower productivity has become visible during 
the training period. Table 4 and Figure 3 display the main results. The 
mean standardized bias (Panel IV of Table 4) is reduced considerably 
through matching for three of four groups; the bias reduction for female 
unemployed in West Germany is below 50 percent, however.  
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Table 4: Individuals taking up a subsidised job following a short-term training 
measure (Treated) and matched persons that have participated solely 
in a short-term training measure (Controls): 
Labour market status, estimated average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT), mean standardized bias before and after matching  
and bias reduction three years after programme start during the 2nd 
quarter of 2002 
      Long-term subsidy 
  
    
Male West
Female 
West Male East 
Female 
East 
Treated 0.48 0.59 0.52 0.65
Controls 0.34 0.38 0.29 0.34I. Share in regular unsub-sidised employment 
ATT 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.31
Treated 0.58 0.67 0.59 0.69
Controls 0.53 0.65 0.39 0.44II. 
Share not unemployed 
and not in labour market 
measure ATT n.s. n.s. 0.20 0.25
Treated 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.05
III. Share with unknown destination (Diff. II-I) Controls 0.19 0.27 0.10 0.11
Before 12.39 11.36 10.47 10.83
After 3.14 6.06 1.29 2.06IV. Mean standardized bias 
Reduction 0.75 0.47 0.88 0.81
V. Observations   285 117 537 551
Note: n.s. = not significant at α = 0.05. Long-term subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months. 
 
The main conclusions are:  
• Locking-in effects are rather large for the group of individuals, who take 
up a subsidised job after a short-term training measure (Figure 3): 
Matched control persons find regular employment rather quickly and/or 
avoid unemployment directly after their training measure. 
• Labour market outcomes of unemployed, who participated in a short-
term training measure and received a wage subsidy (Table 4, Panel I 
and II), are rather similar to the results of all subsidised individuals 
(Table 2, Panel I and II for the long-term subsidy). However, labour 
market outcomes of the matched control sample are much more fa-
vourable for previous participants in a short-term training measure. Ac-
cordingly, Panel I in Table 4 shows positive treatment effects – in the 
range of 14 to 31 percentage points – of a subsequent wage subsidy on 
the probability to be in regular (unsubsidised) employment three years 
after the start of the subsidy. But these effects are smaller than those 
found in Panel I of Table 2, which were not conditional on the participa-
tion in a short-term training measure.  
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• Panel II in Table 4 implies that a subsequent wage subsidy increases 
the probability to avoid unemployment in East Germany. However, for 
West Germany the analysis finds no additional significant effect of a 
wage subsidy on the avoidance of unemployment, if a short-term train-
ing measure has already taken place.  
Figure 3: Estimated average treatment effects on individuals taking up a sub-
sidised job conditional on having participated in a short-term train-
ing measure (ATT) during the 2nd quarter of 2002 
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Note: Displayed effects are significant at α = 0.05. Long subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months.  
 
Thus, might short-term training serve as a substitute for wage subsidies? 
Our results might be explained by the fact that (rather cheap) short-term 
training measures within firms already have a favourable effect on the la-
bour market possibilities of participants; the effect may sometimes be of 
such a size that a subsequent EGZ does not exert any additional impact. 
However, as has already been argued, it is also possible that the weaker 
impact is due to a larger share of individuals, who proved less productive 
during the training period and thus required additional support for their 
integration. Finally, individuals participating in these training measures 
are already a selected sample, and results for them may not be extended 
readily to the entire sample of unemployed.  
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5 Summary 
We apply matching methods to estimate the average effect of targeted 
wage subsidies for hard-to-place workers in Germany. Our results show 
that wage subsidies may increase the employment prospects of supported 
workers to a considerable amount. For previously unemployed individuals, 
three years after the start of the programme, the share in regular em-
ployment is from 25 to 42 percent higher in the treatment group than in 
the matched control group. A comparison between groups of unemployed 
persons taking subsidised employment with matched control groups of in-
dividuals moving directly into unsubsidised employment indicates that dif-
ferences in the employment prospects are rather small after three years. 
Finally, participation in short-term training measures goes hand in hand 
with better labour market prospects compared to the entire sample of un-
employed. This may result, however, from the previous training as well as 
from the selection into these measures. As a consequence, the effect of 
subsidization on participants in a previous short-term training measure is 
more modest: The share in regular employment increases by 14 to 31 
percentage points, if a short-term training measure is followed by a wage 
subsidy. 
However, some points deserve further discussion. Comparing the esti-
mated impacts in the first two scenarios, one may be tempted to doubt 
the effectiveness of subsidies: The control group in the second scenario is 
characterised by a comparable distribution of characteristics, but its mem-
bers entered unsubsidized employment directly. So, was it really neces-
sary to support those who actually got the subsidy? The possibility of 
deadweight effects notwithstanding, our impression is that heterogeneity 
in the matches for workers with the same characteristics is responsible for 
these results. Thus, the same worker, who needs a subsidy to get one job, 
will be fully productive in another job. A line for future research of course 
is to gather more information on jobs (while we analysed the workers’ side 
of the match only). 
The results of the third scenario – even if the estimated impact is positive 
– raise the question to what degree short training measures within firms 
might obtain results similar to an EGZ (at much lower costs). In addition 
to the previously raised argument of heterogeneity in the job matches, 
selectivity with respect to further EGZ support might occur, since employ-
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ers learn about a participant’s productivity during the training period. It is 
also plausible that case managers utilize short training measures in a kind 
of trial and error process. If a cheaper training measure suffices to inte-
grate a previously unemployed person into a firm, than the more time-
consuming decision for or against an EGZ may readily be postponed. 
There is some evidence from case studies in selected agencies that short 
training measures in firms and the EGZ were sometimes seen as substi-
tutes, thus the choice between them was rather an incidental matter 
(ZEW et al. 2006, 61). 
To conclude, our findings are in line with results from the literature; most 
studies that estimate effects of targeted wage subsidy programmes on the 
treated find positive effects on individual employment probabilities. For 
any assessment of the benefits of wage subsidies, it should be noted that 
the methods applied in this paper do not identify deadweight loss or po-
tential displacement and substitution effects. In this sense Fay (1996) 
emphasises that careful controls are an important part of designing wage 
subsidy programmes. Otherwise, there is a risk that firms use schemes as 
a permanent subsidy to their workforce. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Variable means of selected attributes (0 = no, 1 = yes) for individuals 
taking up short-term (S) or long-term (L) subsidised employment, 
the sample of unemployed persons (U), the sample of individuals 
taking up unsubsidised employment (E), individuals taking up long-
term subsidised employment following a short-term training meas-
ure (LM) and the sample of individuals that have participated in a 
short-term training measure (M) 
  Male Female 
Variables (0 = no, 1 = yes) S L U E LM M S L U E LM M 
West Germany             
Individual Characteristics    
Foreign nationality 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.08
Age 25 to 29 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.16
Age 30 to 34 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.20
Age 35 to 39 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.23
Age 40 to 44 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18
Age 45 to 49 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.13
Age 50 to 54 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.08
Age 55 to 59 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.04 - 0.02
Age 60 to 64 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 - - - 0.00 0.03 0.01 - - 
Lower secondary degree (9 years) or less,  
no vocational training 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.30 0.34 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.35 0.25 0.21 0.20
Medium secondary degree (10 years),  
no vocational training 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05
Vocational training 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.59 0.55 0.45 0.52 0.62 0.54
Highest secondary degree (12-13 years) 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.14
University degree 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Health problems 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.14
Disabled at least 50% 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.08
Five-year-history    
Measure of active labour market policy 0.54 0.57 0.38 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.61 0.34 0.31 1.00 1.00
No unsubsidised regular employment 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.17 0.16
Up to 1 year in regular employment 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.15
1-2 years in regular employment 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15
2-3 years in regular employment 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15
3-4 years in regular employment 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.27 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.18
4-5 years in regular employment 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.36 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.19 0.32 0.06 0.22
Number of observations 1398 2044 69393 113584 285 10321 657 1064 45610 58798 117 5561
East Germany             
Individual Characteristics    
Foreign nationality 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
Age 25 to 29 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.12
Age 30 to 34 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.21 0.19
Age 35 to 39 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.22
Age 40 to 44 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.20
Age 45 to 49 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16
Age 50 to 54 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.09
Age 55 to 59 -  0.00 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.03 - 0.00 0.12 0.05 - 0.03
Age 60 to 64 -  0.00 0.04 0.01 - - - - 0.02 0.00 - - 
Lower secondary degree (9 years) or less,  
no vocational training 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.06
Medium secondary degree (10 years),  
no vocational training 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Vocational training 0.82 0.80 0.74 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.77 0.86 0.80
Highest secondary degree (12-13 years) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06
University degree 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05
Health problems 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.08
Disabled at least 50% 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
Five-year-history    
Measure of active labour market policy 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.37 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.70 0.64 0.53 1.00 1.00
No unsubsidised regular employment 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.21 0.18
Up to 1 year in regular employment 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.26
1-2 years in regular employment 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18
2-3 years in regular employment 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.13
3-4 years in regular employment 0.31 0.30 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.12
4-5 years in regular employment 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.37 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.12
Number of observations 372 3580 42832 58803 537 7900 253 3379 31829 25958 551 4918
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months, while long-term subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 
months. 
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